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Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct.
2323 (2010)
Heather Briggs
I. Introduction
Levin v. Commerce Energy1 considers whether state authorities may
discriminatorily tax the sale and distribution of natural gas to Ohio


Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 230 S. Ct. 2323, 2325 (2010) (holding that
"under the comity doctrine, a taxpayer’s complaint of allegedly discriminatory state taxation,
even when framed as a request to increase a competitor’s tax burden, must proceed
originally in state court.").
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consumers.2 Plaintiffs-respondents Commerce Energy, Interstate Gas
Supply and Gregory Slone sued Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of
Ohio, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, alleging
tax discrimination against independent marketers in the natural gas
industry.3 Ultimately, this case questions whether a federal district court
maintains the appropriate authority to rule on tax discrimination complaints
that are "framed as a request to increase a commercial competitor’s tax
burden."4
II. Background
Ohio residents typically purchase natural gas from local distribution
companies (LDCs) servicing their particular region.5 Such customers may
alternatively elect to purchase gas from independent marketers (IMs).6
LDCs own and operate their own natural gas pipelines, providing both gas
and delivery as a bundled product.7 In contrast, IMs provide their own gas
supply but rely on LDC pipelines for service.8 Customers who opt for an
IM provider thus receive gas from the IM, and delivery from the LDC.9
Based on this discrepancy, Ohio treats LDCs and IMs differently for tax
purposes, providing three tax exemptions to LDCs that IMs may not
claim.10 First, LDCs are exempt from the standard sales and use taxes that
IMs must pay.11 Instead, LDCs pay a gross receipts excise tax, which is
lower than the IMs’ sales and use taxes.12 Additionally, "LDCs are not
subject to the commercial activities tax imposed on IMs’ taxable gross
receipts."13 Lastly, inter-LDC gas sales are also excluded from the gross
receipts tax, which their IM counterparts must pay if purchasing gas from
an LDC.14
Respondents sued Petitioner Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of
Ohio, in federal court, claiming discriminatory taxation of IMs in violation
of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses.15 Respondents sought
2 See id. at 2328 (providing a summary analysis regarding the applicability of the Tax
Injunction Act, comity doctrine and Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004)).
3. Id. at 2328–29.
4. Id. at 2328.
5. See id. (discussing the schematics of Ohio gas supply and distribution).
6. Id.
7. Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2328.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. (detailing the relevant tax exemptions).
11. Id.
12. Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2328.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2328–29.
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declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that Petitioner invalidate and
refuse to recognize or enforce the tax exemptions.16 In granting the
Commissioner’s motion to dismiss, the District Court held that the Tax
Injunction Act (TIA)17 did not bar the lawsuit, but nevertheless refused to
exercise jurisdiction as a matter of comity.18 The Court of Appeals
reversed, agreeing with the District Court’s TIA analysis but disagreeing as
to the comity issue.19 In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit determined
that a footnote in Hibbs v. Winn20 effectively limited the scope of the
comity doctrine in such cases.21 Agreeing with the District Court’s
dismissal on comity considerations, the Supreme Court reversed the
appellate ruling, stating that the "Ohio courts are better positioned to
determine – unless and until the Ohio Legislature weighs in – how to
comply with the mandate of equal treatment."22
III. Holding
In a 9-0 opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that "comity
considerations . . . preclude the exercise of lower federal-court adjudicatory
authority over this controversy, given that an adequate state-court forum is
available to hear and decide respondents’ constitutional claims."23 Within
its comity analysis, the Court conceded that the Tax Injunction Act
similarly prohibits federal courts from ruling on "the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State."24 However, without
specifically ruling as to TIA applicability, the Court determined that the

16. Id. at 2329.
17. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2010).
18. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2329 (2010) (explaining the
lack of exercise of jurisdiction by the court). "The TIA did not block the suit, the District
Court initially held, because Respondents . . . were ‘third-parties challenging the
constitutionality of [another’s] tax benefit,’ and their requested relief ‘would not disrupt the
flow of tax revenue’ to the State." (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
24a, Levin, 130 S. Ct. 2323 (No. 09-233).
19. See id. ("While agreeing that the TIA did not bar respondents’ suit, the Sixth
Circuit rejected the District Court’s comity ruling.").
20. See Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2284–92 (2004) (determining that neither the
TIA nor the comity doctrine prohibited federal adjudication of an Establishment Clause
challenge to a state tax credit that provided public funds to parochial schools).
21. See Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2329 ("A footnote in Hibbs, the Court of Appeals
believed, foreclosed the District Court’s ‘expansive reading’ of this Court’s comity
precedents.").
22. Id. at 2335.
23. Id. at 2330.
24. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2010).
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comity doctrine controls in this case.25
Furthermore, the Court
distinguished Hibbs v. Winn in holding that comity doctrine considerations
prevail in circumstances such as those brought forth in Levin, where
plaintiff-respondents seek to improve their position within the tax scheme.26
IV. Future Implications
Unless and until state courts rule on this matter, the disparity between
LDC and IM tax treatment may have negative ramifications for the natural
gas industry. Through this ruling, the Supreme Court has taken a decidedly
hands-off approach with regard to taxation of the natural gas industry.
Avoiding judicial legislation, the Court instead urges state government to
take control. However, until such state action occurs, disproportionate tax
treatment may negatively affect how both the cost and supply of natural gas
are passed down to consumers. In Ohio, for example, tax differentials
between natural gas providers may lead to a more monopolistic industry as
IMs endure disparate operating costs. Such added costs forced upon IMs
will likely be passed down to consumers. Those added costs could
effectively trigger an avalanche effect, as consumers instead opt for the
better financial alternative – LDC natural gas supply.

25. See Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2332–33 ("[W]e hold that comity precludes the exercise of
original federal-court jurisdiction in cases of the kind presented here.").
26. See id. at 2336 (providing three factors that form the basis as to why the comity
doctrine controls).

NRG Power Marketing v. Maine Public
Utilities Commission, 130 S. Ct. 693 (2010).
Anthony Flynn Jr.
I. Introduction
This case requires an understanding of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine.
The Federal Power Act (FPA) authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to oversee the regulation of inter-state power grids, to
approve contracts for the sale of power, and to ensure that all such contracts
contain rates that are "just and reasonable."1 In 1956, the Supreme Court
released twin decisions which held that FERC must presume that contract
rates freely negotiated between reasonable parties meet the just and
reasonable standard in the FPA.2 These twin-holdings came to be known as
the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine. In 1968, the Court expanded on the MobileSierra Doctrine, explaining that "the [FPA] is premised on contractual
agreements voluntarily devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates
abrogation of these agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public
necessity."3
In 2008, the Court expanded the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine again. In
Morgan Stanley v. Public Utility District No. 1, the Court held that the
Mobile-Sierra presumption of just and reasonable terms in a freely
negotiated contract disputed before FERC applies a purposefully high bar to
challengers who are either purchasers of wholesale electricity or sellers.4
The Court noted the reasoning for such a high-bar to challenging contracts
as the substantial need to "foster[] stability in the electricity market, to the
long run benefit of consumers."5
Condensing the Court's jurisprudence on the Mobile-Sierra
Doctrine, it can be said that the doctrine prohibits FERC from invalidating a
 Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)–824(a) (1990).
2. See Fed. Power Comm. v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956)
(providing some understanding of what the just and reasonable standard suggests). "[W]hile
it may be that [FERC] may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would
produce less than a fair return . . . In such circumstances the sole concern of [FERC] would
seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest . . . ." See also
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp. et al., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
3. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968).
4. See Morgan Stanley Capital Group v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 128 S.
Ct. 233, 2747 (2008) ("We hold only that FERC may abrogate a valid contract only if it
harms the public interest").
5. NRG Power Marketing v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm., 130 S. Ct. 693, 700 (2010).
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contract unless the terms of the contract are wholly against public interest.6
FERC must presume a freely negotiated contract is just and reasonable.7
II. Background
"For many years, New England's supply of electricity capacity was
barely sufficient to meet the region's demands."8 In 2006, the New England
Independent System Operator, which runs the region's power grid, entered
into an agreement with a group of electrical generators.9 This agreement
established a market mechanism that would set prices by auction at later
dates, but would in-theory provide enough electricity for New England
consumers.10 The agreement, which was reached after negotiations of 115
parties,11 stipulated that any challenges to the prices of the energy supply
will be adjudicated under the Mobile-Sierra "public interest" standard.12
After the agreement was approved by FERC, six of the eight objecting
parties challenged FERC's approval in federal court.13 These parties
claimed that the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine should not apply to challenges
from non-contracting parties.14 They claimed non-contracting parties
should be held to a lower challenging standard with no presumption of just
and reasonable terms.15 On this issue, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
found for the objectors.16
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Mobile-Sierra standard should apply when a contract rate is "challenged by
an entity that was not a party to the contract."17
III. Holding
The Court held that the Mobile-Sierra presumption applies to all
parties.18 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsberg notes that "if FERC itself
6. See Fed. Power Comm., 350 U.S. at 354–44 (" . . . [T]he sole concern of the
Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public
interest . . . .").
7. See Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 128 S. Ct. at 2737. (finding that FERC must
presume a contract for wholesale energy that has been freely negotiated meets the statutory
just and reasonable requirement).
8. NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 694.
9. Id. at 697.
10. Id. at 697–98.
11. See id. at 697 (noting that eight of these 115 parties opposed the agreement).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 697.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 698.
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must presume just and reasonable a contract rate resulting from fair, armslength negotiations, how can it be maintained that noncontracting parties
nevertheless may escape that presumption?"19
Justice Ginsburg characterized the Circuit Court's analysis of the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine as incorrect. 20 The D.C. Circuit claimed the "public
interest" standard was at odds with the "just and reasonable" standard."21
However, the Court found that the two standards work in tandem. 22 FERC
should use the public interest standard as a frame by which to evaluate
"what it means for a rate to satisfy the just-and-reasonable standard."23
The Court found that to allow noncontracting parties to circumvent
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine would undermine the doctrine's stated goal of
promoting stability of energy supply.24 The Court stated in dicta that thirdparty interests are well-served by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, as any
contract rate that "seriously harms the consuming public" may be
disallowed by FERC.25
The Mobile-Sierra doctrine serves as a guidepost for FERC to
evaluate whether energy contracts rise to the standards of good public
policy. In this decision, the Court reiterated the benchmarks by which
FERC can judge these contracts. First, the contracts are negotiated by
sophisticated parties. 26 Secondly, the interest in providing those parties
with predictable and consistent review of their contracts outweighs the
interest in third-party challenges.27 Therefore, the Court finds, having a
high-bar like the "just and reasonable" presumption apply to third-party
challenges as well as challenges from parties who were part of the
negotiation serves the public interest in a stable energy supply by ensuring
contracts are not capriciously invalidated by FERC.28

18. See Id. at 701 (holding that the "Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend on
the identity of the complainant who seeks FERC investigation.").
19. Id. at 700.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 621).
24. See NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 701 ("A presumption applicable to
contracting parties only . . . could scarcely provide the stability Mobile-Sierra aimed to
secure.").
25. Id. at 700 (quoting Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 621).
26. See id. at 699 (noting that the contracts that are reviewed by FERC are "freely
negotiated" between "sophisticated parties").
27. See id. at 701 ("A presumption applicable to contracting parties only . . . could
scarcely provide the stability Mobile-Sierra aimed to secure.").
28. See id. (noting the "essential role of contracts" in providing "stability [for] the
electricity market, for the longrun (sic) benefit of consumers").
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The Court reversed the Circuit Court's opinion with regard to the
District court's application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and remanded the
case for further proceedings.29
IV. Dissent
Justice Stevens issued a lone dissent in this case. Justice Stevens
expressed concern about the favorability shown towards energy producers
and companies and the lack of concern for individual consumers.30 He
found little comfort in the Court's dicta stating third-party interests are
already well-served in the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. Justice Stevens views
the doctrine as setting too high a bar for a challenge to a contract rate, as
FERC may only invalidate a contract if the public interest is "seriously
harmed."31
Justice Stevens characterized the true purpose of the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine as preventing an energy seller from unilaterally repudiating a
contract due to market fluctuation. 32 According to Justice Stevens, only if
the market fluctuation would drive an energy seller out of business would
the seller meet the bar of Mobile-Sierra—impairing the public interest by
stopping energy production—and thus, be allowed by FERC to alter the
contract.33 Justice Stevens found that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine was
altered by the Court's decision in Morgan Stanley v. Public Utility District
No. 1 to create a presumption of a "just and reasonable contract."
Justice Stevens believes the public interest is "the interest of
consumers in paying 'the lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the
maintenance of adequate service,'" an interest which is greater than the
interest in contract stability34 Justice Stevens found the Court's extension of
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to challenges from noncontracting parties to be
adverse to the interest of the consumers. As the general public, a thirdparty to the contract negotiations, will end up paying the rates to purchase
29. See id. at 701 ("[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals . . . is reversed to the
extent that it rejects to the application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to noncontracting
parties.").
30. Id. at 701-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court held the [FERC] could not set
aside such a contract as unjust and unreasonable, even though it saddled consumers with a
duty to pay prices that would be considered unjust and unreasonable under normal market
conditions . . . ").
31. Id. at 702 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. at 822 ("[U]nder the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a contract rate requires a
finding of 'unequivocal public necessity.")).
32. Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 702 ("[U]nder the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a contract rate
requires a finding of 'unequivocal public necessity . . . .') (citing Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct.
2733 (slip. op. at 22) (Stevens, J., dissenting (quoting Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 793)).
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energy from the utility, their interests are not represented a contract
negotiated by a wholesaler and a distributor.35 As Justice Stevens doubts
that the ordinary consumer's interests are representing in the contract
negotiations, he believes their challenges should be held to a lower standard
before FERC.36
V. Future Implications
This decision does not break new ground in contracts, administrative
or energy regulatory law. In the past year, FERC has cited the decision
twice in opinions upholding contract agreements,37 which may validate
Justice Stevens's concern that the standard sets the bar too high for FERC to
protect consumers.38 FERC cited NRG in an opinion requiring a public
utility to provide information on the tariffs it has levied against energy
suppliers.39 By exercising its oversight authority to review tariffs aimed at
reigning in energy suppliers, and using the NRC decision to do so, FERC
may be benefiting "big energy" by hindering the public utilities' pricing
power.
Professor Robin Craig cited the NRG Power case as evidence of the
leeway courts will give to Congress regulating the energy industry under
the instate commerce clause.40 Professor Craig found that decisions such as
NRG Power show the courts given broad interpretations to statutes such as
the FPA.41 She notes that Congress now has authority over "the

35. Id. at 703.
36. See id. (explaining that there should be a lower standard). "[By] requiring that
FERC find some greater degree of harm to the public than would be required under the
ordinary just-and-reasonable standard . . . the Mobile-Sierra doctrine leaves little room for
respondents—at least one of which did not negotiate the rate but must nonetheless purchase
electricity at [this] price . . . —to assert their private interest in making a rate challenge."
37. See Kentucky Municipal Power Agency v. E.ON U.S., 132 F.E.R.C. P63,007,
66,064 (F.E.R.C. 2010) ("The settlement . . . can be found by the Commission to be fair and
reasonable and in the public interest.") 66,067 (using the NRG Power Marketing decision to
set the standard of review). See also High Island Offshore Sys., 131 F.E.R.C. P63,007,
P63,025 (F.E.R.C. 2010) (setting the standard of review using the NRG Power Marketing
decision to set the standard for review and approving the Settlement Agreement).
38. Supra note 25.
39. See Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys., 131
F.E.R.C. P61,163, 61,720 (F.E.R.C. 2010) (ordering Midwest ISO to revise their tariff plan)
61,725, n.37 (using the NRG Power Marketing decision to set the standard for review).
40. See Robin Kundis Craig, Multistate Decision Making for Renewable Energy and
Transmission: Spotlight on Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 771 n.36.
41. See id. at 780 ("Moreover, [the Court] suggests that Congress's authority over
energy, including renewable energy, remains very broad.").
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transmission of electricity, rates, rate-making, and even the sources of fuel
used to produce electricity."42
Though the effects of NRG Power are still being determined, it is clear
that the impact of this case is vast, in so far as it creates a very high bar to
overturn negotiated agreements vis a vis energy pricing. Justice Stevens’
dissent notes that the Mobile-Sierra presumption gives industry great
leeway in setting prices, and not allowing third-parties to challenge without
overcoming the presumption provides no check for high prices in the
energy market.43 While Justice Stevens is undeniably correct that
consumers have an interest in the lowest prices possible, there is an equally
strong interest in having reliable energy supply. If third-parties are able to
challenge contracts at a lower burden, then the negotiating parties will not
be able to rely on the terms of their negotiations. Contracts negotiated at
arms-length between competing parties will ensure prices do not rise to an
unreasonable level, and any collusion between the competing utility and
distributor would invalidate the contract as against public-interest. The
Mobile-Sierra doctrine protects freedom of contract and allows for a
constant supply of energy at a predictable contract price.

42.
43.

Id.
NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 703 (Stevens J., dissenting)

South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct.
854 (2010).
T. Peter Choi
I. Introduction

South Carolina v. North Carolina1 came as an appeal to a Courtappointed Special Master’s unilateral 2009 decision to permit three
nongovernmental entities to intervene in the two states’ ongoing
dispute over riparian rights.2 It concerned the applicability of the
Supreme Court’s longstanding holding in New Jersey v. New York,3
which stood for the proposition that "[a]n intervenor whose state is
already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling
interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all
other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not
properly represented by the state."4 The State of South Carolina
("South Carolina") contested the Special Master’s conclusions on the
grounds that the three non-governmental entities had not sufficiently

Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. South Carolina v. North Carolina (South Carolina II), 130 S. Ct. 854, 854 (2010).
2. See South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 858–59 ("After holding a hearing, the Special
Master granted the [three non-state entities the right to intervene] and, upon South Carolina's
request, memorialized the reasons for her decision in a First Interim Report. South Carolina
then presented exceptions, and we set the matter for argument.").
3. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) (holding that the City of
Philadelphia should not be allowed to intervene because its interests were adequately
represented by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania). In New Jersey, the Supreme Court
considered whether the City of Philadelphia may intervene in an original action in which the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was already a party. See id. at 370. The State of New
Jersey had brought suit against the State of New York and the City of New York seeking an
equitable diversion of the Delaware River, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had
been allowed to intervene pro interesse suo. See id. at 370–71. When the trial court’s
entered a decree enjoining the defendants from diverting from the Delaware River more than
440,000,000 gallons or water daily, the City of New York moved for a modification to the
decree; in response, the City of Philadelphia made a motion to intervene. See id. at 371–72.
However, the Supreme Court denied the City of Philadelphia’s motion upon determining
that its interests could not be distinguished from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s. See
id. at 372–73. Observing that "[a]n intervenor whose state is already a party should have the
burden of showing some compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a
class with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly
represented by the state," the Court determined that the City of Philadelphia had not met its
burden and denied its motion. Id. at 373.
4. Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
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demonstrated that their interests were distinct from that of the State
of North Carolina ("North Carolina").
II. Background

South Carolina initially had filed suit against North Carolina in
2007 by invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to gain
equitable apportionment of the Catawba River.5 Their dispute was
thought to have been on course for an eventual resolution when the
Court appointed in January of 2009 a "Special Master"6 who would
have "the authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of
additional pleadings,"7 among several other specifically enumerated
privileges.8 However, when the Special Master granted three
nongovernmental entities—namely, the Catawba River Water Supply
Project ("CRWSP"), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("Duke Energy"),
and the city of Charlotte, North Carolina ("Charlotte")—to intervene
in the action as separate parties upon determining that they all
appeared to have satisfied the requirements set forth in New Jersey,9
South Carolina took exceptions to her findings and appealed,10
thereby prompting the Court to take this case up for a second time for
the purposes of clarifying its holding in New Jersey.
Thus, at issue before the Court in this case was whether South
Carolina’s exceptions to the Special Master’s findings had been
justified, or to put it another way, whether CRWSP, Duke Energy,
5. See South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 858 ("The State of South Carolina brought this
original action against the State of North Carolina, seeking an equitable apportionment of the
Catawba River.") See also id. at 859 (noting that South Carolina sought "a decree that
equitably apportions the Catawba River . . . , enjoins North Carolina from authorizing
[excessive] transfers of water . . . , and declares North Carolina’s permitting statute invalid
to the extent it is used to authorize [excessive] transfers of water . . . .")
6. South Carolina v. North Carolina (South Carolina I), 128 S. Ct. 1117, 1117
(2008).
7. Id.
8. See id. (stating that the Special Master shall have several powers). These powers
include the power "to direct subsequent proceedings, to summon witnesses, to issue
subpoenas, and to take such evidence as may be introduced and such as she may deem it
necessary to call for. The Special Master is directed to submit Reports as she may deem
appropriate."
9. See South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 861 ("[T]he Special Master found that each
proposed intervenor had a sufficiently compelling interest to justify intervention. ").
10. See id. at 858–59 ("After holding a hearing, the Special Master granted the
motions and, upon South Carolina's request, memorialized the reasons for her decision in a
First Interim Report. South Carolina then presented exceptions, and we set the matter for
argument.").
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and Charlotte should have been allowed to intervene as separate
parties to the action under New Jersey.11 Justice Alito, writing for the
5–4 majority,12 rejected13 the broader rule that the Special Master had
used to allow all three parties to intervene in the action,14 noting that
"a compelling reason for allowing citizens to participate in one
original action is not necessarily a compelling reason for allowing
citizens to intervene in all original actions"15 Instead, he considered
each of the three nongovernmental entities’ interests separately to
determine whether each had satisfied New Jersey’s "appropriate
intervention" standard.16 Ultimately, he concluded that CRWSP and
Duke Energy had satisfied New Jersey’s "appropriate intervention"
standard,17 but that the city of Charlotte had not.18
III. Holding

Specifically, Justice Alito noted in his opinion that CRWSP had
"carried its burden of showing a compelling interest in the outcome
of this litigation that distinguishes [it] from all other citizens of the
party States."19 Given CRWSP’s "unusual" position as a product of a
joint venture between the two states,20 he stated that "neither State

11. See id. at 861 ("Applying [New Jersey], the Special Master found that each
proposed intervenor had a sufficiently compelling interest to justify intervention. The
Special Master rejected South Carolina’s proposal to limit intervention to the remedy phase
of this litigation and recommended that this Court grant the motions to intervene.").
12. Id. at 858.
13. See id. at 862 ("We . . . decline to adopt the Special Master’s proposed rule.").
14. See id. at 861 (describing the rule that the Special Master had "distilled," albeit
incorrectly, from the Court’s holding in New Jersey).
15. South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 862.
16. See id. at 864–68 (applying the New Jersey standard to CRWSP, Duke Energy,
and Charlotte, respectively).
17. See id. at 864–67 ("Applying the standard of New Jersey v. New York, supra, here,
we conclude that the CRWSP has demonstrated a sufficiently compelling interest that is
unlike the interests of other citizens of the States"). Justice Alito went on to note that "[w]e
conclude, as well, that Duke Energy has demonstrated powerful interests that likely will
shape the outcome of this litigation."
18. See id. at 867–68 ("We conclude, however, that Charlotte has not carried its
burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action.").
19. Id. at 865.
20. See id. at 864‒65 ("The CRWSP is an unusual municipal entity, established as a
joint venture with the encouragement of regulatory authorities in both States and designed to
serve the increasing water needs of Union County, North Carolina, and Lancaster County,
South Carolina.").
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can properly represent the interests of the CRWSP in this
litigation."21
Similarly, Justice Alito granted Duke Energy the right to
intervene as a separate party upon finding that it "demonstrated
powerful interests that likely will shape the outcome of this
litigation."22 He determined that, "any equitable apportionment of
the river will need to take into account the amount of water that Duke
Energy needs to sustain its operations and provide electricity to the
region,"23 and that "Duke Energy has a unique and compelling
interest in protecting the terms of its existing FERC license and the
CRA that forms the basis of Duke Energy’s pending renewal
application."24
However, because Justice Alito was unable to distinguish its
interests from those represented by the State of North Carolina, he
stated that Charlotte should not be allowed to intervene as a separate
party.25 He noted that, "a State’s sovereign interest in ensuring an
equitable share of an interstate river’s water is precisely the type of
interest that the State, as parens patriae, represents on behalf of its
citizens."26
IV. Dissent

Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, harshly
criticized the majority, claiming that "[t]he Court’s decision to permit
non-sovereigns to intervene in this case has the potential to alter in a
fundamental way the nature of our original jurisdiction, transforming
it from a means of resolving high disputes between sovereigns into a
forum for airing private interests."27 In his view, the proper course of
action would have been to deny not just Charlotte, but also CRWSP
and Duke Energy from intervening in this original action,28 because
"the apportionment of an interstate waterway is a sovereign
21. South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 865.
22. Id. at 866.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 867–68 ("We conclude, however, that Charlotte has not carried its
burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action.").
26. Id. at 867.
27. South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
28. See id. at 876 ("I would grant South Carolina’s exceptions, and deny [all three]
motions to intervene.").
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dispute"29 whereas determining "a private entity’s interest in its
particular share of the State’s water . . . is an ‘intramural dispute’ to
be decided by each State on its own."30 He also noted that such
nongovernmental entities’ interests could have been adequately
preserved simply by granting them participation as amici curiae.31
V. Future Implications

This ruling appears to signal significant implications for not just
the Court, but also for nongovernmental entities that are potentially
seeking to intervene in other equitable apportionment actions as well.
While the Court did not necessarily expound on the existing New
Jersey standard—New Jersey’s "appropriate intervention" standard is
still good law—as noted by Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent, this
is the first time that the Court has ever allowed private claimants to
intervene in equitable apportionment actions.32 Hence, the latent
implication of this case appears to be that, so long as an interested
party—regardless of whether or not it is a sovereign state or a
nongovernmental entity—can demonstrate that it has compelling
interests apart from those already represented by an original party to
the suit, it can intervene in the action. While it is difficult to
determine the frequency of such apportionment actions, it can surely
be expected that CWRSP, Duke Energy, and Charlotte will not be the
last to petition to the Court to intervene.

29. Id. at 869.
30. Id. at 870 (citing New Jersey).
31. See id. at 876 ("[T]he benefits private entities might bring can be readily secured,
as has typically been done, by their participation as amici curiae.").
32. See id. at 869 ("Even though equitable apportionment actions are a significant part
of our original docket, this Court has never before granted intervention in such a case to an
entity other than a State, the United States, or an Indian tribe."). See also Lyle Denniston,
The Key to Settling a Big Fight, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 27, 2010, 7:40 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=111197 ("For the first time in the Court’s history of
refereeing such interstate disputes, the majority allowed private claimants to something
owned by sovereign states to assume a key role in the lawsuit.").

